Abstract-we propose a practical anonymous payment scheme with anonymous accounts. By means of our proposed scheme, the size of a bank's database is dramatically reduced. Also, the issue of e-coins for an anonymous account is controlled by several issuers, who represent a bank and who can be chosen by the customer or assigned by the system, on the current available issuers list according to the internet conditions. Our scheme does not require the assistance of a mutually entrusted third party.
INTRODUCTION
Due to the fast progress of the internet, many services such as electronic payments, electronic auctions, electronic voting, and electronic shopping, etc. can be achieved over it. However, these internet services are still inhibited because of concerns about network security. The critical success factors for an enterprise to provide attractive services on the internet are money flow, material flow, and information flow. Entrepreneurs have to provide various services on the internet in order to keep customers and attract new ones for electronic commerce. From a customer's point of view, anonymity, security, efficiency, and flexibility are the basic criteria of electronic payment systems. Also, from the point of view of a bank or the government [l] , security, selective anonymity, e.g., anonymity just for small payments, and implementation costs are most important. It is believed that a payment system that satisfies security, anonymity, efficiency, and micropayment may work well in the near future [l] .
So far, secure payment schemes have been proposed by many researchers from practical and theoretical points of view [2-121. A secure payment scheme is a protocol that consists of a customer, a shop, and a bank. Both the shop and the customer own their accounts with the bank. There are two types of payment scheme for verifying the validity of an electronic payment transaction: on-line schemes and off-line schemes. In an on-line scheme [3, 4, 8, 10, 12] To solve all the above problems, we propose a practical multiauthority payment scheme with anonymous accounts that satisfies security, anonymity, efficiency, and micropayment properties. In our proposed scheme, by the concept of anonymous accounts, the bank's database is dramatically reduced.
Also, our scheme does not require a single entrusted authority to issue e-coins. The candidates of issuers can be elected from honorable persons or audit managers. The bank can be regarded as a manager and cannot issue any e-coins without the help of these reliable money issuers. The proposed scheme would not only satisfy real world environments without a single trusted authority or with some absent/dishonest authorities, but could also increase the availability of the issuers, and increase protection against forgery by making it harder for perpetrators of fraud to learn the group secret key. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some of the existing building blocks in the literature that we use in our scheme. In Section 3, we present our payment scheme. Section 4 is devoted to discussion. Finally, a concluding remark is given in Section 5.
BUILDING BLOCKS
Here we review some existing building blocks that we use in our payment scheme. In this section, we will briefly review this scheme.
Let m be the message to be signed, and p and q be two large strong prime numbers so that q divides (p -1). Let p be a generator of 2; [25] . Let g -p @'-1)/q, z E 2, be the signer's secret key and y =.p gz be the corresponding public key. The scheme is described in the following. 
Untraceable EMail Schemes
Several anonymous channel protocols [28-301 have been presented for preserving senders' anonymity. The mix-net method is used in [28] to achieve a sender -untraceable e-mail system. In the m&net method, encrypted messages are sent to a mix server who will disarrange all received messages and send them to the next server. Finally, the last server will send the encrypted messages to their destinations. The basic assumption of the mix-net method is that at least one mix server is honest. In the mix-net method, it is harder to decide if a sender has sent his message to the receiver via an anonymous channel or if the receiver has received it. In practical implementation considerations, if there are audit records in the system, then this problem is solved. Otherwise, a sender can first send his message to some entrusted authority via the m&nets, and then the authority resends the message to the real receiver. The dc-net method, based on the dining cryptographers problem, is used in [29] to realize a sender untraceable email system which is unconditionally or cryptographically secure, depending on whether it is based on one-time keys or on keys generated by pseudo-random number generators. In the de-net method, an entrusted mix-server is unnecessary, but all potential senders must collaborate in the mail system when someone is delivering a message. In [30], Juang et al. presented an untraceable e-mail system in wireless communication. The user anonymity in this scheme is based neither on any entrusted authority nor on the collaboration of all potential senders.
3. MULTIAUTHORITY PAYMENT SCHEME WITH ANONYMOUS ACCOUNTS
In this section, we propose an efficient multiauthority payment scheme. To reduce the bank's (the account manager's) database, we use anonymous accounts in this scheme. Before a customer can use an anonymous account, he must withdraw blind e-coins from a normal bank account, extract the real e-coins from the blind e-coins and then transfer the e-coins to an anonymous account. In our scheme, blind threshold signatures [22, 23] are used to distribute the power of a single trusted money issuer. The scheme involves a customer, shops, n' e-coin issuers and a bank. During the preparation phase, the bank first publishes all public parameters, and then all issuers cooperate to generate their threshold verifiable public keys and distribute shares to each other without a trusted third party [16] . In the anonymous account requesting phase, a customer requests an anonymous account from the bank via an anonymous channel [28-301. In the withdrawal phase, a customer uses the uniquely blind threshold signature technique [19, 22, 23 ] to get a blind encrypted e-coin from t issuers and derives the real e-coin from the encrypted e-coin. In the anonymous deposit phase, the customer can transfer e-coins withdrawn in the withdrawal phase to an anonymous account opened in the anonymous account requesting phase. In the payment phase, if a customer decides to pay a shop some money, then he sends a PayWord [12] to the bank. The bank can check if the PayWord is valid and does not exceed the amount of the e-coin. If yes, he balances the shop's account and stores the PayWord in the anonymous account.
Basic Assumptions
The underlying assumptions of this scheme are as follows.
(a) There are at least (n -t + 1) honest money issuers, where n is total number of money issuers issuing e-coins and t > n/2 is the threshold value of the blind threshold signature scheme. (b) Every eligible customer can communicate with at least t out of n issuers and the shop. The concept of blind threshold signatures [22, 23] and one-way permutation functions combined with users' identifications [19] are used to achieve a uniquely blind threshold signature scheme in our proposed scheme.
In (28-301, several anonymous channels have been proposed. The anonymous channels proposed in [28, 30] can be directly used in our scheme. :
For simplicity, the message authentication in our protocol is achieved by a secure signature scheme [33] in which the signed message m is attached with its signature Certs('H(m)), where 3-1 is a secure one-way hash function and S is the identification of the signer. The verification of the signature can be achieved by the comparison method [34].
Notations
Let 5 be a public one-way permutation function [19] , let ti be a public one-way hash function [32] . Let n' be the number of the money issuers before the preparation phase, QUAL be the set of the nondisqualified money issuers after the preparation phase, let n be the number of nondisqualified,money issuers QUAL. Let Zi, 1 < i 5 n', denote the identification of money issuer i before the preparation phase. Let Ii, 1 5 i 5 n, denote the identification of nondisqualified money issuer i after the preparation phase. Let d, be the secret key chosen by a customer and let dx; be the secret key chosen by Zi. The customer and Zi can publish their corresponding public keys e, and eri . Anyone can get e, and eri by means of some authentication service (e.g., the X.509 directory authentication service [27]). U sin secure public key signature schemes [33] , g Zi and the customer can generate signatures of messages using their own secret keys dr, and d,. Anyone can verify the signatures using the corresponding public keys eri and e,. Let p and q be two large strong prime numbers such that q divides (p -l), let p and C be two generators of 2; [25j and C be a random number generated by a generic distributed coin flipping protocol. and h q, [(P-')/q.
Let " ]I " d enote the ordinal string concatenation operator, let x zp y denote x = y mod p. For clarification of our scheme, we assume that the message transmitted in the following protocol is via some secure authentication scheme; that is, that no one can fake any one else's messages and no one can deny the messages he really transmitted.
The Proposed Scheme
Our proposed scheme is described as follows. PHASE 1. THE PREPARATION PHASE. The bank first publishes all public parameters n', t, p, q, g, h, all identifications of e-coins issuers and the public one-way permutation E and the public one-way hash function 7-f. Then, all Zi, 1 < i 5 n', must cooperate to distribute their secret shadows to each other. Each Zi, 1 < i 5 n', carries out the following steps.
1. Zi chooses a secret key Zi E 2, and two secret polynomials fi(x) = Cili aiYkxk and f,!(x) = c";' ! k c a,,kxk such that ai,c = zi, it computes &,k =P ga"," h"i,k, 0 5 k 5 t -1, and it sends (&,k, 0 5 k < t -1) to Zj, 1 < j 5 n', j # i. 2. Upon receiving (&&k, 1 5 j < n', j # i, 0 5 k 5 t -1) from all other issuers, Zi sends Si,j E-Q fi(xj) and 6i,j ~q fl(xj), w h ere xj is a unique public number for Zj, secretly to every Zj , 1 5 j 5 n', j # i. 3. When Zi receives all bj,i and 6$,i, 1 5 j 5 n', j # i, from other issuers, he verifies if the shares Sj,, and S(,i received from Zj are consistent with the certified values Gj,l, 0 5 1 5 t -1, by checking whether g6jt~hs~,~ =p n~~~(~j,~)Z'l. If it fails, Zi broadcasts that an error has been found, publishes &j,i and I$~, the authentication information of Sj,,, b;,i, and Zj. Each issuer, except the dishonest issuer Zj, then marks Zj as a disqualified issuer and builds the set of nondisqualified issuers QUAL. 4. Every issuer Zi, i E QUAL, broadcasts Vi,k zp ga+, 0 5 1 5 t -1. 5. When Zi , i E QUAL, receives all Vi,k, 1 < j 5 n, j # i, from other issuers in QUAL, he verifies if g6jsi sp n~~,'(Vj,~)2i'. If this check f ai s or an index i, Zi broadcasts that an error 1 f has been found, publishes a,,, and 6&, the authentication information of bj,i, S(i,i. 1, and any t issuers in QUAL can compute zj , fj (x), vj,k, 0 < k 5 t -1. Anyone then can generate the public shadows Pj,i =p g6j,' =p n~~~(Uj,l)x", w h ere i and j E QUAL, and the group public key Y up IljcQuAL ~j zp JJjEQUAL vj,o. The group public key y and all public shadows Pj,i, where i and j E QUAL, the personal public key yi zr, Vi,0 zp gzi can be published by each issuer Xi. Without loss of generality, we assume that n nondisqualified issuers QUAL are 1i, 1 5 i I: n. This can be made by renaming the index of each issuer Zi, i E QUAL. PHASE 2. THE ANONYMOUS ACCOUNT REQUESTING PHASE. Let ID, be the identification of some customer. To request an anonymous account, ID, does the following.
1. ID, first randomly chooses an RSA secret key drn, and the corresponding public key en&, and sends Eeb(e& to the bank via an anonymous channel. 2. The bank decrypts message Eeb(eIoc), opens a new anonymous account with an account number ACC,, sets the counter CNT, = 0, generates a secret key K, for this account, and sends Eelo, (ACC, 11 K,) back to ID, via an anonymous channel or a broadcast channel. 3. When ID, receives ,?&,(ACC, 11 K,) f rom the bank via the anonymous channel or broadcast channel, he decrypts the message and gets anonymous account ACC, and secret key K,. PHASE 3. THE WITHDRAWAL PHASE. Let ID, be the identification of some customer. In this phase, ID, applies the uniquely blind threshold signature scheme to get a blind e-coin from t honest issuers. Without loss of generality, we assume that t out of n issuers requested by ID, are Ij, 1 5 j < t. ID, and Ij, 1 < j 5 t, then perform the following steps.
1. Each Ij randomly chooses a number kj E Z,, computes +j -p gkj and sends ?j to ID,. Step (b). 3. After receiving the message 7jz, Ij, 1 < j 5 t, checks if ID, has enough money in the bank. If not, Ij rejects the money withdrawal of ID,. If yes, he informs the bank to deduct 5 dollars from ID,% account and computes dj + 7jZ(Zj + cI"=,+l(fi(zj)(n:=l,kzj (-xk/(zj -zk))))) + kj and sends ij back to ID,. 4. Upon receiving all ij, 1 5 j 5 t, ID, computes sj --Q Ojpi + LYE, and checks if g-'j7Jjrrj -p (IE"=,+~(%)) (Ilk-1 L#j(--Ikl(2j-lk)))(-~), 1 5 j 5 t. If Sj is not valid, he has to ask the -' corresponding issuer to send it again. Otherwise, ID, computes s zp & sj. 5. After exact t issuers inform the bank to deduct J: dollars from ID,'s account, the bank submits the deduction operation. In our scheme, customers will first request anonymous accounts, withdraw blind e-coins, and deposit these e-coins into anonymous accounts. When customers withdraw blind e-coins, to prevent an issuer from sending an invalid partial signature to a customer, a partial signature can be checked in Step 4 of the withdrawal phase. The following lemma ensures the correctness of partial signatures. LEMMA 1. The customer's partial signature (ri, si) is valid if Ii is honest.
PROOF. By means of our scheme, we have
After the withdrawal phase, the threshold e-coin will be verified using the group public key in
Step 2 of the anonymous deposit phase. Lemma 2 ensures the correctness of the threshold e-coin.
LEMMA 2. The signature (r, s) generated in the withdrawal phase is a legal blind threshold signature on message m for the Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme.
PROOF. The validity of the signature (r, s) can easily be established as follows: g+ y'r Ep mg --T cp* Ji CYzl eir 9 ' q m. I
For achieving the divisibility property in our scheme, we use the concept of PayWord chains proposed in [12] in our proposed scheme. In the payment phase, for paying ID, 6 dollars, a customer sends (ACC,, K,(ID,, ACC,, H ID, E, X,-(,+,)(c))) to the bank. The bank first retrieves the corresponding e-coin (T, s, m, T, 'H,-,(u) ), where 7 5 z dollars have been spent in some shops for this e-coin, and verifies whether 7&('&-,(a)) = 'Hz-(,+,)(~). The concept of the uniquely blind threshold signature technique [19, 22] is used in our scheme to make our ecoins collision free; that is, all e-coins requested by honest customers are unique. The definition of a uniquely blind threshold signature scheme is as follows. DEFINITION 1. A uniquely blind threshold signature scheme is a blind threshold signature scheme in which the signing function is injective (one-to-one) and all the signatures requested by the honest requesters are distinct.
It is clear that the signature scheme used in the withdrawal phase is a uniquely blind threshold signature scheme since its signing function is bijective [22, 23] 
Security Considerations
Lemma 3 guarantees the security of the preparation phase in Section 3.
LEMMA 3. The preparation phase in Section 3 is a secure protocol for distributed key generation in discrete-log based cryptosystems. , in order to do cheat detection when some issuer cheats, the public shadows (Pj,i + g6jsi =p I-I:::(Vj,P',, h w ere i and j E QUAL, will be published by all issuers in our proposed scheme. All the public shadows (Pj,i)y where i and j E QUAL, can be derived by the public .values vi,k =p gQ+, i E QUAL ,0 5 k 5 t -1, broadcasted in Step 4 of the preparation phase. These public shadows will not disclose any extra information of the group secret key. The preparation phase of Section 3 ls secure; that is, the view of an adversary of the protocol is simulatable [16] . 1 The blind signature generation in our proposed scheme is the scheme proposed in [22] . Lemma 4 ensures the blindness of our proposed scheme.
LEMMA 4. The threshold signature generation used in the withdrawal phase of Section 3 is blind 1221. I Preserving the privacy of customers from all the issuers and the bank is the basic property of our scheme. Also, the amount of an e-coin spent by a customer must be less or equal to 2 dollars withdrawn from the issuers and bank. Our proposed scheme preserves customers' anonymity, but not untraceability if the same anonymous account is used for several transactions. Complete untraceability is preserved if each anonymous account is used only once [3], but this property may cause a customer to pay extra money for this added-value service. We now show that our proposed scheme possesses the above properties.
In our protocol, a malicious bank may try to get the identification of the customer in the following possible ways.
(1) Derive the identification of a customer who gets an anonymous account ACC, in the anonymous account requesting phase.
(2) Derive the link between the authentication message which is sent to the issuers in the withdrawal phase and the e-coin which is used in the anonymous deposit phase. (3) Derive ID, from the e-coin (7, s, m).
To derive the identification of the customer in the anonymous account requesting phase is computationally infeasible since it clearly contradicts the assumption that there exists a secure anonymous channel.
To derive the link between the authentication message which is sent to the issuers in the withdrawal phase and the e-coin which is used in the payment phase is computationally infeasible since it clearly contradicts the assumption that the blind threshold signature scheme is secure.
To derive ID, from the e-coin (T, s, m) is computationally infeasible since it clearly contradicts the assumption that c is a secure one-way permutation function.
From the above, the privacy of customers is protected in our proposed scheme. In our protocol, any withdrawn e-coins will be deposited into an anonymous account in the bank's database. When some customer spends an e-coin, the bank will check if this e-coin is in an anonymous account in order to prevent double-spending. So all withdrawn e-coins can be used only once. Also, a malicious customer, let us call her Alice, may try to spend extra e-coins in the following possible ways.
In our scheme, all issuers collaborate to generate threshold verifiable public keys. An eligible customer needs to withdraw an e-coin from t issuers and deposit this e-coin into his anonymous account before he can spend some money. If Alice can get an extra e-coin herself, then she can make a counterfeit blind threshold signature. It clearly contradicts the assumption that the blind threshold signature scheme is secure.
Second, if Alice can forge a signature and pass the user authentication check done by Ij, 1 5 j 5 t, in the withdrawal phase, then she can receive an extra e-coin. It clearly contradicts the assumption that the RSA signature scheme is secure.
Third, given an used e-coin (T, s, m, 7, P&-,(a)), which represents 7 < x dollars and was spent by a customer, stored in the bank's database, if Alice can derive another e-coin (T, s, m, e, 'P&-(,+,) (a)), which represents e dollars, then she can spend extra money. The difficulty of this attack relies on the security of the one-way hash function 7-l 112,321.
From the above, no customer can spend over the value of an e-coin by more than x dollars withdrawn from the bank in our proposed scheme.
Implementation Considerations
As mentioned in [l] , in the near future everyone will be able to issue money via the internet. When exchanging the currencies of poorly-rated money issuers, an appropriate discount rate will be applied. In our scheme, the bank can choose honorable people as money issuers. Anyone can serve as the bank, and this person only manages all the accounts in the bank. He cannot issue any e-coins without the help of issuers. Also, anonymity will be a value-added feature. A customer will pay extra money if he uses this feature, or else this feature would be an extra service for an entrepreneur to keep customers and attract new customers. In our scheme, any anonymous accounts are closed if the lifetime of these accounts expires or the volume of these accounts becomes empty. The size of a bank's database is dramatically reduced by this approach. The system parameters, including the expired date and the maximum amount of money which an anonymous account can store, etc., can be chosen and published by the bank. For simplifying the verification process in the payment phase, a customer can only send (ACC,, K,(RD 11 ACC, 11 ID, 1) 7)) to the bank. The bank first decrypts Ac,(RD 11 ACC, 11 ID, 1) T) and checks whether the redundant information RD is in it. If yes, the bank verifies if 7 + E < x. If yes, the bank debits ACC, with e dollars, pays E dollars into ID,'s account. This approach is more efficient, but some power is distributed to the bank; that is, the bank can operate all anonymous accounts. This approach is like the current banking system in which all records manipulated by the bank must be recorded and there must be some designated auditors to trace these records at any time.
In our proposed scheme, a customer must open an anonymous account, withdraw e-coins from some issuers, and deposit these e-coins into the anonymous account before he can spend money in some shop. These four phases can be simplified into just two phases: the withdrawal phase and the payment phase. In the modified withdrawal phase, the anonymous account ACC, is chosen by the customer, but not by the bank. In the modified payment phase, the bank must create an anonymous account ACC, when it receives a valid e-coin (T, s, m) = (r, s, All the above procedures can be inserted into programs and executed automatically. In real world environments, the candidates of issuers can be elected from honorable persons or audit managers.
For practical implementation, we suggest the parameters t = 2 and n = 3.
Performance Considerations
In our scheme, the preparation phase only has to be performed once and can be done off-line. In the anonymous account requesting phase, a customer requests an anonymous account via an anonymous channel. All secure anonymous channels proposed in [28-301 can be applied to our scheme, but we recommend these systems in [28,30] since we only need an anonymous channel which gives periodic delivery and not continuous delivery.
In the withdrawal phase, every customer will request a blind threshold signature as an e-coin. The size of a blind threshold signature is the same as the size of an individual signature and the verification process of a blind threshold signature is the same as that of an individual signature [22, 23] . The extra computation required for achieving the divisibility property of an e-coin is just hashing [12] . The value -zk/(xi -xk), 1 5 k 5 n and k # i, in Step 3 of the withdrawal phase can be computed off-line. So each issuer needs to compute only one modular exponentiation in our scheme, which is the same as in the underlying blind signature scheme. Compared with the underlying blind signature scheme, the extra cost for signing a blind threshold signature is to compute C,"=,+i fj(~i)(ntk=~,~~~(-xk/(5i -xk))) in Step 3 of the withdrawal phase, which contains n-2 modular multiplications and n -t additions.
To reduce the computational cost for the requester, the partial signature verification in
Step 4 is not done except when the final e-coin cannot satisfy the verification equation in
Step 2 of the anonymous deposit phase. In this method, the requester only needs to compute two modular exponentiations and one modular inverse in
Step 2 of the withdrawal phase, which is the same as in the underlying blind signature scheme. 
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